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Abstract: Defense-in-depth is a fundamental safety principle for the design and operation of nuclear
power plants in the United States. Despite its general appeal, some authors have identified potential
drawbacks in defense-in-depth in its potential for hazardous state concealment. To prevent this
drawback from materializing, we propose in this work a novel safety strategy, namely “observabilityin-depth”. We characterize it as the set of provisions designed to enable real-time monitoring and
identification of hazardous states and accident pathogens, and to conceive of a dynamic defense-indepth safety strategy in which defensive resources, safety barriers and others, are prioritized and
allocated dynamically in response to emerging of risks. To better illustrate the role of observability-indepth in the nuclear industry, we examine in this work the exemplar case study of the Three Mile
Island accident and several “event reports” from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
database. The selected cases clarify some of the benefits of observability-in-depth, by contrasting
outcomes in situations where this safety principle was violated with instances of proper
implementation.
Keywords: Observability-in-depth, accident pathogen, latent failure, defense-in-depth, safety blind spot.

1. INTRODUCTION
Defense-in-depth is a fundamental safety principle for the design and operation of nuclear power
plants in the United States. First conceptualized in the 1950s, defense-in-depth became the basis for
risk-informed decisions by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) [1,2]. It is also known
and adopted under different names in other hazardous industries, for example layers of protection in
the chemical industry [3]. In its bare essence, defense-in-depth consists in the design and
implementation of multiple safety barriers, technical, procedural, and organizational, conceived to
prevent accidents from initiating, to block accident sequences from escalating, and to mitigate adverse
consequences should the previous barriers fail. Accidents typically result from the absence,
inadequacy, or breach of such defenses [4,5].
Despite its general appeal, some authors have identified potential drawbacks in defense-in-depth [6,7].
For example, its successive lines of defense can (inadvertently) enhance mechanisms that conceal the
transition of the system to an increasingly hazardous state, making “systems more […] opaque to the
people who manage and operate them” [6]. As a result, system operators may be left blind to the
possibility that hazard escalation is occurring, thus decreasing their situational awareness and
shortening the time they have to intervene before an accident is released. In other words, defense-indepth may create safety “blind spots”. In extreme cases the efﬁciency of defense-in-depth may be
degraded or worse may backﬁre, hampering the ability to safely operate the system. Several accident
reports identified hidden failures and unobservable accidents pathogens as important contributing
factors to the accidents, the Three Mile Island and the Texas City refinery accidents being
representative cases [8,9]. The importance of these considerations cannot be underestimated. The
NRC database for event reports, that we will analyse in detail later on in this work, reports more than
80 cases of unmonitored release paths for contaminated air and more than 1400 cases of loss of
containment1.
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The search, executed on the Licensee Event Reports (LERs) database, for “unmonitored AND release AND
path” hits 89 results, while “loss AND containment” hits 1477 results if the search is executed only in the titles
and abstracts of the reports. The count of loss of containment events exceeds 8000 cases when the search is
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To avoid this potential negative effect, defense-in-depth, and more generally any safety strategy,
ought to be augmented with additional guidelines for system design and operation. In previous works,
we introduced the observability-in-depth principle as the requirement that all safety-degrading events
or states that safety barriers are meant to protect against be observable/diagnosable [7,10]. This
principle implies that various features be put in place to observe and monitor for the state and
breaches of any safety barrier, and reliably provide this feedback to the operators.
In this work, we illustrate the essential role of observability-in-depth in the nuclear industry. To this
aim, we briefly examine the well-known Three Mile Island accident and several “event reports” from
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) database. The reports and case studies selected
clarify some of the benefits of observability-in-depth, by contrasting outcomes in situations where this
safety principle was violated with instances of proper implementation (for example in detecting
adverse conditions and guiding safety interventions before an incident unfolding).
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide an overview of the
observability-in-depth principle in the context of safety diagnosability2. Section 3 highlights the role
of observability-in-depth in the nuclear industry through a detailed analysis of the scenarios selected
from the NRC database and from well-known exemplar cases. Section 4 concludes this work.
2. SAFETY DIAGNOSABILITY AND OBSERVABILITY-IN-DEPTH
Observability is a Control Theoretic concept, which roughly indicates how well the internal states of a
system can be inferred from the system’s inputs and outputs3. More formally, a generic dynamical
system given by Eq. (1)

!# x (t) = F(x(t), u(t))
"
$# y(t) = G(x(t), u(t))

(1)

is said to be observable if the knowledge of the set of inputs u(t) and the set of outputs y(t) –
measured from some initial time t0 – are sufficient to obtain a unique estimation of the system’s state
vector x(t) for all future instants following t0. Equation 1 indicates a functional relationship between
the evolution of the internal states of the system and the system’s inputs and current states. In Control
Theory, the term state vector has a precise formal definition and it constitutes the foundation for most
analytical techniques in this field. Roughly speaking, the state vector of a system is the minimum set
of variables that contain all the necessary information about the internal condition of a system at some
time t0; and that knowledge, along with the input(s) to the system (e.g., operators’ inputs) is sufficient
to determine the system’s outputs or behavior.
The ability to observe or diagnose the transition of a system to a hazardous state or the occurrence of a
safety-degrading event is critical for the continued safety of operations. Roughly speaking, operators
make decisions during system operation, which are both based on and affect the internal
conditions/states of the system [11]. If process monitoring fails to provide information regarding the
actual conditions/states of a system, there is a distinct possibility that operators will make flawed
executed in the entire document. The database is available at https://lersearch.inl.gov/LERSearchCriteria.aspx,
query executed on 12/09/2013.
2
This section builds upon and heavily relies on our previous publications on the subject: [7,9,10].
3
The terms observability and diagnosability are used in a related manner. While there are some differences
between them (in their domain of applicability and the nature of the underlying mathematical models they apply
to, time-driven dynamical systems in the first case and discrete event systems in the other), these differences are
not relevant for our purposes, and we will occasionally use these two terms interchangeably. Observability-indepth remains the overarching category under which both observability and diagnosability will be subsumed.
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decisions, which in turn can compromise the safe operation of the system or fail to check the
escalation of an accident sequence (e.g., no decision when an intervention is warranted).
To better illustrate the importance of the notion of observability of hazardous states, consider the
following illustrative example4. A system departs from nominal operating conditions and begins
drifting toward an increasingly hazardous state as shown in Figure 1. Various safety barriers can be
interposed between the nominal operating conditions (states) and the accident release (for some
specifics about this point, in ref. [9] for example, the system is a splitting tower at an oil refinery,
which is filling up with hydrocarbon. The barriers are safety pressure valves and specific design
features designed to contain any overflow before the accident, namely loss of containment, occurs).
We represent the accident trajectory by plotting the evolution over time of the hazard level of the
system, here considered loosely speaking as the closeness of the accident to being released. Assume
that safety barriers are implemented to prevent the system from reaching hazard level H0 in Figure 1,
and that additional barriers are in place to block further escalation past H1 and H2 should the previous
barriers fail or prove inadequate.

Figure 1. Schematic representation of system diagnosability/observability. Adapted from [9]

The solid line in Figure 1 represents the actual hazard level of the current state of the system, hereafter
noted as H(t), while the dashed line represents the operators’ assumed hazard level, Ĥ(t), estimated
from available information or through direct sensor observation.
The gap between these two quantities, the actual and the estimated hazard levels can be noted as:

ΔH = || H(t) - Ĥ(t) ||

(2)

This gap can result for example from the absence of observability into hazardous conditions in the
system (e.g., missing sensors), or degraded observability (e.g., flawed or miscalibrated sensors),
which can mislead the operators about the actual state of the system. Examples of these situations will
be examined shortly.
In a previous work [9], we argued that all safety-degrading events or hazardous states that defense-indepth is meant to protect against be diagnosable, that is, the failure or breach of any element in the
implementation of defense-in-depth be observable—directly monitored or reliably estimated. This
constitutes one aspect of the observability-in-depth safety principle. This principle implies among
other things, and as a first step, that safety-critical elements in a system be properly instrumented to
reflect their actual state, the extent of their degradation if any, and their breach if or when that occurs.
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This is based on ref. [9] by the authors and it is included here for convenience and illustrative purposes.
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Many examples of accidents occurred, or were not prevented in a timely manner, because of a lack of
implementation of this principle. We will examine such cases in Section 3.
In light of Figure 1, the purpose of observability-in-depth is (i) to minimize the gap between the actual
and the estimated hazard levels (ΔH), and (ii) to ensure that at the hazards levels associated with
various safety barriers, H0, H1, and H2 in the figure, the two curves coincide if these hazard levels are
reached (e.g., ΔH = 0 if H0 is reached—the safety barriers designed to prevent the system from
reaching H0 is breached). The end-objective is to provide sufficient time for the operators to
understand an unfolding hazardous situation and intervene in a timely manner to abate it. By contrast,
a persistent gap between the actual and the estimated hazard levels, as shown in Figure 1, leaves the
operators blind to the developing hazardous situation, and it shrinks the time window, and options,
available for the operators to intervene.
While these considerations may be viewed as general common sense, it is important not to
underestimate their scope and the potential benefits arising from their formalization. Consider, for
instance, the following incident occurred at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, where the
unobservability of the degradation of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head barrier could have
resulted in a massive loss of coolant with potential meltdown of the reactor [12]. In March 2002 a
cavity of about 20-30 square inches was discovered by chance (and almost too late) in the reactor lid,
and it “extended completely through the 6.63 inch thick carbon steel reactor pressure vessel (RPV)
head down to a thin internal liner of stainless steel cladding” [12]. The degradation and breach of the
reactor lid developed over an extended period of time unbeknown to the operators and plant
managers. It was due to corrosion from a leak of boric acid. This lack of observability of the state or
degradation of the reactor pressure vessel head barrier could have resulted in a massive loss of coolant
with potential meltdown of the reactor [12]. This was a serious near miss, and the only element that
prevented an accident from occurring was the internal cladding, which withstood the primary system
pressure over the cavity during system operation and was neither designed for nor qualified to
perform such function [12].
There are a number of lessons to be learned from this near miss at the Davis-Besse power plant, and
many recommendations were provided in the NRC report [12], including for example heightened
regulatory oversight of the plant. In addition to the specific recommendations provided, we propose
that this and many other similar near misses support a more general recommendation, namely the
adoption of the observability-in-depth safety principle, which was violated in this case, and whose
implementation could have identified the degradation of this RPV safety barrier in a more timely
manner.
Observability-in-depth can be implemented in many ways, and it requires creativity and technical
ingenuity to design and implement in a variety of contexts and for monitoring different types of
hazards and states of safety barriers. Regulations cannot be prescriptive in this regard, but a safety
case can be required from the designers/operators to demonstrate compliance with this principle.
The depth qualifier in observability-in-depth has both a causal and a temporal dimension, and it
characterizes the ability to identify adverse states and conditions far upstream (early) in an accident
sequence. It also reflects the ability to observe emerging accident pathogens and latent failures before
their effect becomes manifest on the system’s output or behavior, or before an increasingly hazardous
transition occurs in an accident sequence. To illustrate this point, consider Figure 2, which represents
a set of safety barriers and various hazardous states. Each hazardous transition/escalation in an
accident sequence has a set of underlying causes, and Figure 2 includes the underlying causes of a
transition from Si to Sj in the form of a Fault Tree.
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Figure 2. Schematic illustration of Observability-in-Depth

The condition Pi in the fault tree is a latent failure or accident pathogen [13]; it does not have a visible
effect on the system behaviour or operation, until the second condition in its AND gate occurs. If the
system reaches state Si, the hazardous transition to Sj will occur, thus further advancing the accident
sequence. The ability to observe such causal factors or accident pathogens in an accident sequence
before they have a visible effect on the system operation is one measure of the depthness of
observability. The other measure is that no safety barrier should conceal the fact that the system has
breached any one safety barrier and has reached a hazardous state the engineers and system designers
meant to protect against.
3. EXAMPLES OF ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES WHEN OBSERVABILITY-IN-DEPTH IS
COMPROMISED OR NOT IMPLEMENTED
In this section we provide a few examples that illustrate some of the adverse consequences that can
follow from the lack of, or degraded, observability into hazardous conditions. The purpose is to show
both the importance of observability-in-depth by examining cases when it is not implemented, and by
the same token to highlight the set of problems that it can help address or prevent. We begin with the
well-known Three Mile Island accident and examine it from this perspective of observability-in-depth
(or deficiencies in). Then we discuss several “event reports” from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission database, which reflect potential concealment of accident pathogens in the lines of
defense.
3.1. The archetype case study: the Three Mile Island accident
The Three Mile Island (TMI) accident of March 1979 is perhaps the most famous incidents in the
history of nuclear power plants in the United States. A complex sequence of events led to the loss of
the water-coolant, which resulted in a partial core meltdown [8] and caused over $2 billion in
damages [14].
The chain of causality leading to the accident has been widely discussed, see for example [8, 15, 16],
and the accident became the subject of numerous debates for the complexity of the sequence of events
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starting from a leaky valve and emergency pump shutdown and leading to the reactor partial
meltdown. The accident resulted from a combination of factors, including four separate malfunctions
in the internal and external cooling circuits, overall sloppy maintenance and organizational
deficiencies5 [8, 15], and operators’ errors. Our purpose here is not to revisit the accident sequence,
but to examine it from one particular perspective, namely that of observability-in-depth, and to
highlight how deficiencies in the implementation of this principle contributed to the accident sequence
or failed to prevent its escalation. Some brief technical knowledge is required for our discussion. A
schematic representation of the reactor core with the cooling system circuits is shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Simplified schematic of the reactor core and the cooling circuits, adapted from [20]

The heat generated by the reactor core at the TMI plant was removed by a heat exchanger at the
intersection of two cooling circuits: a primary internal circuit directly connected to the reactor core,
and a secondary external circuit connected to steam turbines (see Figure 3). Main pumps as well as
emergency backups and pressure relief valves existed for both the internal and external circuits. Steam
downstream of the heat exchanger drove the turbines (the power generation elements). This particular
design, as well as the main pumps and emergency backups, and the pressure relief valves are specific
elements in the implementation of defense-in-depth. And while they were particularly important for
the safe operation of the plant, the fact that observability-in-depth was lacking or compromised in
their design, as we will discuss shortly, rendered this a defense-blind strategy. Moreover, the inability
to observe and assess the states of some of these safety barriers not only failed to prevent the
escalation of the accident sequence, but also directly contributed to its advancement. In short, we
argue that the Three Mile Island accident was to a large extent the result of a violation of the
observability-in-depth safety principle, and while its proper implementation would not have prevented
the initiating events from occurring—some of the factors noted previously were directly responsible
for this, namely technical failures, sloppy maintenance, and organizational deficiencies—it would
have ensured that the accident sequence was terminated in a timely manner before core meltdown.
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Gorinson et al. [17] and Hopkins [8] highlight how events similar to those indicated in Figure 4 had occurred
in an incident 18 months earlier at the Davis-Besse reactor. Also previous failures of the relief valves had been
witnessed in reactors manufactured by the same firm of the TMI plant. These and other near misses and warning
signs apparently went unnoticed by the management of the TMI nuclear reactor.
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The accident mainly concerned the primary and secondary cooling circuits of the reactor core. The
adverse sequence of events was triggered by a leak in the external cooling circuit, which caused the
main pumps to shut down [8]. Two days prior to this event, the emergency pumps of the external
circuit had been shut down for maintenance work and were still inoperable. This condition, apparently
unknown to the operators at the time of the accident (first unobservability), led to the impossibility to
dissipate the heat from the internal circuit. As a result, the reactor core began to overheat, leading to
its preventive shutdown. However, the pressure in the internal circuit kept increasing due to “decay
heat” from the reactor core [8]. At this point, the emergency relief valve of the internal circuit opened,
letting the coolant escape and lowering the pressure to the nominal value.
The relief valve should have closed when the pressure fell to proper levels, but it became stuck open.
Instruments in the control room however indicated that the valve was closed [18]. The decrease in
pressure activated the emergency high-pressure injection pumps in the internal circuit to prevent the
core meltdown [8]. After noticing the pressure rise in the internal circuit, the operators were unaware
of the loss of coolant from the internal circuit. This is the second major unobservability in this
accident sequence, and it was due not only to the flawed sensor that was monitoring the status of the
relief valve, but also to the absence, by design, of provisions to monitor and estimate the coolant flow
in the primary internal circuit. We conceive of this situation as a gross violation of the observabilityin-depth safety principle—two major elements in the implementation of defense-in-depth were not
properly monitored and their status not observable.
The operators, still unaware of the loss of coolant from the internal circuit, manually throttled down
the emergency pumps. This was considered in hindsight as a significant operator error and it led
directly to the accident—the reactor’s (partial) core meltdown. However, as shown here, this decision
was the result of flawed or missing information that degraded the operators situational awareness and
failed to convey the hazardous conditions of various safety barriers. It took them about 2 hours and 20
minutes to understand that a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) was ongoing. The total meltdown was
then prevented by flooding the reactor core with cold water. While this extreme measure prevented
the release of radioactive material, major irreversible damage had already been done [8].
Different authors have debated at length the controversial issue of “operator error” in the early
termination of the high-pressure injection pumps [8, 15]. Hopkins points out that, “had the pumps
been allowed to continue operating, the accident could have been avoided” [8]. The “design flaws of
the relief valve and its monitoring system caused the control room to receive an incorrect signal of its
position. The operators then acted on this incorrect understanding of the plant condition. To the best
of our knowledge, there is no explanation in the literature as to why this condition unfolded.
The impossibility to monitor and diagnose an ongoing LOCA from the relief valve status is not the
only source of unobservability. For instance, there was no instrument that allowed the operator to
understand how much water covered the reactor core [18]. The time history of the water level could
have improved the situational awareness of the operators and their understanding of the actual hazard
level reached by the reactor.
Perrow choose this accident as the archetype of his “normal accident theory”, where an accident “is
termed normal because it is inherent in the characteristics of tightly coupled, complex systems and
cannot be avoided” [15]. The normal accident argument, and specifically its applicability to the TMI
accident, was criticized by Hopkins [8]. In his work, Hopkins provides a careful analysis of Perrow’s
point of view and notes that “Perrow claim[ed] that the information available to the operators [was] so
flawed that there was no way they could have been expected to understand what was going on and
react in an effective manner” [8]. Perrow’s conclusion based on this observation is that the accident
was indeed a “normal” occurrence, in the sense that its incomprehensible nature made prevention
impossible. We agree that the flawed and missing information about the status of critical safety
elements at TMI degraded the operators’ situational awareness and hampered their ability to safely
operate the plant. However instead of conceiving and accepting this and similar accidents as
“normal”, we trace back one important element in their causal chain, namely the lack of observability
7

of emerging hazardous states, and we conceive of a safety principle, observability-in-depth, whose
implementation can help prevent similar occurrences.
3.2 Observability-in-depth and the NRC Database of Licensee Event Reports
In this subsection we discuss several event reports from the NRC’s Licensee Event Reports (LER)
database, which illustrate more situations that can results from the lack of, or degraded, observability
into hazardous conditions. By the same token, theses examples highlight an additional set of problems
that fall within the scope of observability-in-depth and which this safety principle can help address or
prevent.
Caveat: It is important to note that this subsection does not constitute nor should it be considered a
basis for statistical analysis of the problem of lack of observability of adverse conditions in the LER
database—although this would be an interesting topic and a fruitful venue for future research. This
subsection is merely for illustrative purposes and to better delineate the scope and extent of
observability-in-depth.
The NRC has required nuclear power plants to submit LER since 1980, and more than 51,0006 of
these reports have since been submitted. Commercial nuclear reactor licensees are required to report
certain event information when adverse conditions occur in a nuclear power plant, which are beyond
its technical specifications [19, 20]. For example, the malfunction of a required safety barrier or the
discovery of a potential design flaw would trigger the need for an LER. Once an LER is submitted,
NRC staff review it to understand and confirm the licensee’s assessment of the situation. NRC staff
experts also determine whether the licensee’s resolution of the issue continues to maintain adequate
levels of safety and protection of the public [21]. The NRC provides public online access to the LER
database. Each report consists of an abstract, a description of the events sequence, the event
significance and implications, the identified causes, the implemented corrective actions, and
additional information (e.g. information on similar previous occurrences).
Compared with the case study approach in Subsection 3.1, event reports (LER) allow the discussion
of a broader set of situations, as the events reported are usually less serious in terms of their
consequences and their occurrence relatively straightforward (or not as involved as in the TMI
accident).
•
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CASE I – Inoperable emergency diesel generator due to low fuel oil in storage tank [22]: this
case resulted from incorrect readings of the level of fuel oil contained in the storage tank of an
emergency diesel generator. A low level of fuel oil (below the required minimum) was
discovered during an inspection and investigation revealed that incorrect readings had been
going on for more than a month. According to the report “the primary cause was a
challenging method for determining tank level” [22]. The level indicator reading was also
susceptible to exogenous disturbances, becoming “more unreliable under adverse conditions
(e.g., poor weather, low light conditions)” [22]. Contributing factors included also a
malfunctioning tank level indicator and the corresponding alarm. The investigation
highlighted the “inadequate instrument design” of the fuel oil tank level alarm and the
indicator.
While this situation did not pose a considerable threat to the safety of the plant, it
constituted a latent failure or adverse pre-existing condition, which when compounded with
other factors, could have further advanced an accident sequence, for example if the
emergency generators were called upon. As such, this condition constitutes a non-negligible
accident pathogen [13]. The fact that it was not observable or its observability compromised
is an instance of failed implementation of the observability-in-depth principle (specifically in
this case a redundant safety barrier was inoperable and its breach was not monitored or
reliably observable).

Query executed on 12/10/2013.
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•

CASE II – Unmonitored Flowpath in Safety Injection Cooling Pumps [23]: In this case a
review of the pump testing surveillances showed that unmonitored flowpaths existed for
different pumps, including the safety injection pump of the cooling system at the Millstone
Nuclear Power Station. According to the report, the regulations current at the time of the
system design, did not “explicitly require” [23] to monitor the total pump flow. The
unmonitored flowpaths diverted flow from the pump discharge prior to the point at which the
flow measurement was taken, hence resulting in a condition of compromised observability of
the pump flow.
At the time of the instrumentation design, the potential impact of unmonitored flowpaths
on the ability to test in order to detect pump degradation was not fully realized [23]. Indeed,
unmonitored flowpaths have the potential to mask the detection of pump degradation by
altering the expected measurements of flow and differential pressure. As with the previous
case, this condition compromises the observability of the state of the pump, thus allowing an
accident pathogen to emerge and go unnoticed.

•

CASE III – Design Deficiency - Potential for an Unmonitored Release Path [24]: In this case
an unmonitored release path of contaminated air was identified during an engineering
evaluation of the station service water system circuit. The identified condition would allow
“contaminated air to enter the service water piping [...] and to subsequently be released to the
outside environment” in case of a Loss of Power/Loss of Coolant Accident event, thus
resulting in a loss of secondary containment [24].
The failure to identify this release path was considered in the report as non-compliance
with General Design Criteria. Moreover, it shows the unobservability of a potential accident
sequence. In other words, in case of loss of secondary containment through this particular
path, the operators would not be able to identify the release of the contaminated air to the
outside environment. While Hopkins claims that “it is not necessary to be able to predict the
precise trajectory of an accident in order to prevent it” [8], we believe that it is necessary to
be able to observe the trajectory in real-time should the accident sequence initiate to be able
to properly manage and contain the incident/accident. Observability-in-depth was in this case
violated by the unobservability of this particular release path.

•

CASE IV – Unmonitored Release Path Due to Radioactive Ash [25]: In this case an
unmonitored release path of contaminated ash was identified during the preparations to put a
heating boiler into service for the winter season. The event report established that “if the ash
on the fire side of the boiler contains radioactive constituents, some of the particulate matter
could be discharged through the boiler exhaust” [25].
This event may appear less severe and unremarkable compared with the previous ones.
But the interesting point here is that the ashes in the boiler resulted from an original
contamination and leak that occurred 25 years before the discovery of the unmonitored
release path. This constitutes an interesting example not only of the unobservability of the
accident pathogen, but also of the lack of a defense barrier against the release of the
contaminated ashes.
Table 1: Selected LER – search keywords and scenarios summary
Case ID and Event Report #
I - 3521996022
II - 4231998027
III - 3541997025
IV - 2451997037

Keyword
Malfunctioning Indicator
Unmonitored
Unmonitored
Unmonitored

Highlighted Scenario
Compromised Observability
Compromised Observability
Unobservability
Unobservability

These cases only represent the tip of the iceberg of instances of adverse conditions that can be gleaned
from the LER database, and which can be considered in some ways instances of violation of
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observability-in-depth. Further examination of this database for events that include unobservability of
adverse conditions and breaches of safety barriers would be a fruitful venue for future research.
4. CONCLUSION
To prevent the hazard-concealing potential of defense-in-depth from materializing, and more
generally to introduce a real-time mind-set into risk analysis and management, we proposed in this
work a new safety principle termed observability-in-depth. We characterized it as the set of
provisions, technical (by design) and operational, designed to enable the monitoring and identification
of emerging hazardous conditions and accident pathogens. Observability-in-depth requires among
other things that all safety-critical elements in a system be properly instrumented to reflect their actual
state, the extent of their degradation if any, and their breach if or when that occurs.
The objective of observability-in-depth is to minimize the gap between the actual and the estimated
hazard levels during system operation, and in so doing to provide sufficient time for the operators to
understand an unfolding hazardous situation and intervene in a timely manner to abate it. As such, we
proposed that observability-in-depth is intimately related to situational awareness, and it supports one
important subset of the latter, namely the awareness of the occurrence of hazardous states in the
system in real time, and the understanding of the potential accident sequences that might follow. We
explained that the depth qualifier in our principle has both a causal and a temporal dimension, and it is
meant to characterize both the ability to identify adverse states and conditions far upstream in an
accident sequence, and to observe emerging accident pathogens and latent failures before their effect
becomes manifest on the system’s output.
Changing mind-sets: Probability Risk Assessment (PRA), another important pillar in the regulatory
regime of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission7, has traditionally been performed offline and
used as a static tool to help identify and prioritize various risks before system operation. Similarly,
defense-in-depth has to some extent an implicit static connotation. Observability-in-depth introduces a
real-time mind-set into risk analysis and management, and it supports the development of a “living”
or online quantitative risk assessment, which in turn can help dynamically re-order risk priorities
based on emerging hazards, and re-allocate some defensive resources accordingly. As such,
observability-in-depth can help conceive of a dynamic defense-in-depth safety strategy in which
some defensive resources, safety barriers and others, are prioritized and allocated dynamically in
response to emerging risks.
This work constitutes a first step in the development of the observability-in-depth safety principle, and
we hope this effort invites other researchers and safety professionals to further explore and develop
this principle and its implementation.
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